Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

Zions First National Bank a national banking
association, and 4447 Associates a Utah general
partnership v. First Security Financial a Utah
corporation : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffery M. Jones; J. Mark Gibb; Durham, Evans and Jones; Attorneys for Appellant.
Craig Carlile; Brent D. Wride; Ray, Quinney and Nebeker; Attorneys for Appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Zions First National Bank v. First Security Financial, No. 930293 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5181

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEAtl
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a
national banking association,
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah
general partnership,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No*

v.

Priority No

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, Honorable F;

Noel

Jeffrey M. Jones
J. Mark Gibb
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES
50 South Main Street
Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Craig Catlilfi
Brent D. Wriddl
RAY, QUINNEY & NfBEKER

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant, 4447 Associates

Attorneys for II
Appellee, Fir$|
Financial

92 N o r t h UniiifiLlilttta Avenue

Suite 2lb|
Provo, Utah

3!4m!ll
iint-

UT AH COURT OF APPEALS
UTAH
DO; „L;_- r
K FU
£

.;ET NO.

lis

HEF*
....

*

'

y

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, a
national banking association,
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah
general partnership,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

Case No. 930923-CA

v,

Priority No. 15

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a
Utah corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL
DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, Honorable Frank G. Noel

Jeffrey M. Jones
J. Mark Gibb
DURHAM, EVANS & JONES
50 South Main Street
Suite 850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144

Craig Carlile
Brent D. Wride
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
92 North University Avenue
Suite 210
Provo, Utah 84145

Attorneys for PlaintiffAppellant, 4447 Associates

Attorneys for DefendantAppellee, First Security
Financial

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

I.
II.

NATURE OF THE CASE
STATEMENT OF FACTS

3
5

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

11

ARGUMENT

12

I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT BECAUSE
FIRST SECURITY DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION TO PAY
ZIONS, IT WAS ENTITLED TO SATISFY ITS OBLIGATIONS
SOLELY WITH CAPITOL, THE ORIGINAL CREDITOR . . . .
A.

The District Court Properly Held That Section
70A-9-318 Requires Actual Receipt of
Notification
1.

2.

12

13

In the Absence of Receipt of
Notification, First Security Was
Entitled To Satisfy Its Obligation To
Its Original Creditor, Capitol

14

By Statute, the Determinative Question
Is Not Whether Zions Gave Notice But
Whether First Security Received
Notification

17

a.

b.

Knowledge of an Anticipated
Assignment Does not Impose any Duty
on First Security

20

Knowledge of An Assignment Alone
Does Not Impose a Duty Upon First
Security to Make Payments to Zions
or to Settle the Debt with Zions . . 21

3.

4.
B.

24

Summary

27

The Trial Court Properly Found That First
Security Did Not Receive Notification As
Required By Section 70A-9-318
1.

2.
II.

The Definitions in Chapter One of the
UCC Do Not Provide Substantive Rules of
Law

28

4447 Associates Has Not Marshaled the
Evidence and Therefore the Factual
Findings of the District Court Must Be
Affirmed

28

The Factual Findings of the District
Court are not Clearly Erroneous

30

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE
PURCHASE PRICE MUST BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD BY ONE
MILLION DOLLARS

CONCLUSION

32
36

iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bank of Salt Lake v. Corporation of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints.
534 P.2d 887 (Utah 1975)

15, 16

Chrysler Dodge Country, USA v. Curley. 782 P.2d 536
(Utah Ct. App. 1989)

18

First American Commerce Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav.
Bank. 743 P.2d 1193 (Utah 1987)

2

Grayson Roper Ltd, v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467 (Utah
1989)

27, 28

Jack B. Parson Cos.. 751 P.2d at 1133

15

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County. 799 P.2d
1156 (Utah 1990)
Reed v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company. 776 P.2d
896 (Utah 1989)

1
28

State v. Vigil. 815 P.2d 1296 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)
Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson Trucking Company.
458 P.2d 1873 (Utah 1969)

2
22

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201 (26) (b)
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3)

3
3, 13, 14, 22, 23, 25

Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-3(3) (j) and 78-2a-3(2) (k)
(1992)

iv

1

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-2-3(3) (j) and 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
I.

Did the district court err in ruling that because
First Security did not receive notification to the
contrary, it was entitled to satisfy its
obligations solely with Capitol, the original
account creditor?
A.

Did the district court err in holding

that section 70A-9-318 governs this action and
requires actual receipt of notification?
Standard of Review:

In reviewing the legal conclusions

of the district court, this court conducts a de novo
review.

Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County,

799 P.2d 1156 (Utah 1990).
B.

Is the district court's factual finding

that First Security did not receive notification
clearly erroneous?1

*4447 Associates states that the question is whether the
district court erred "in ruling that First Security, after being
put on notice of the collateral assignment of the Purchase
Agreement to Zions, did not have a duty to obtain the consent of
Zions prior to entering into the Settlement Agreement" with
Capitol. Brief of Appellants at 4 (emphasis added). To phrase
the issue in this way is misleading. The district court found
that First Security was not put on notice of the assignment.
1

Standard of Review:

Regarding the factual findings of

the district court, the appellate court determines
whether all of the evidence, as marshaled by the
appellant, including all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom is insufficient to support the district
court's findings.2 Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson.
782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah 1989).
II.

Did the district court err in ruling that, as a
matter of law, the purchase price should be
adjusted downward by $1,000,000.00.

Standard of Review:

This issue was decided by the

district court on a motion for partial summary
judgment.

Accordingly, the appellate court reviews the

facts in the light most favorable to the party opposing
summary judgment and affirms a grant of summary
judgment only if the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.

2

First American Commerce

4447 Associates sets forth in its brief the standard of
review for mixed questions of law and fact. It is unclear why
4447 Associates cites this standard because it does not argue
anywhere in its brief that this appeal raises mixed questions of
law and fact. "A mixed question of law and fact is one in which
'the historical facts are admitted or established, the rule of
law is undisputed, and the issue is whether . . . the rule of law
as applied to the established facts is or is not violated.'"
State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1299 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Pullman-Standard v. Swint. 456 U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982)). This
is not the circumstance here.
2

Co. v. Washington Mut. Sav. Bank, 743 P.2d 1193, 1194
(Utah 1987).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
I.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3):

The account debtor is authorized to pay
the assignor until the account debtor
receives notification that the amount due or
to become due has been assigned and that
payment is to be made to the assignee. A
notification which does not reasonably
identify the rights assigned is ineffective.
If requested by the account debtor, the
assignee must seasonably furnish reasonable
proof that the assignment has been made and
unless he does so the account debtor may pay
the assignor.
II.

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-201(26)(b):

A person "receives" a notice or
notification when:
(i)

it comes to his attention; or

(ii) it is duly delivered at the
place of business through which the
contract was made or at any other place
held out by him as the place for receipt
of such communications.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal is from the judgment of the Third Judicial

District Court of Salt Lake County, Honorable Frank G. Noel. The
lawsuit was instigated by Zions First National Bank ("Zions") on
March 3, 1987, to collect amounts allegedly due to Zions under an
agreement between First Security Financial ("First Security") and
Capitol Thrift & Loan Company ("Capitol").
3

Capitol had

previously assigned, as collateral,
agreement to Zions.

its interest in the

Capitol later entered into a settlement

agreement with First Security extinguishing First Security's debt
to Capitol under the agreement.
On February 23, 1990, First Security filed a motion for
partial summary judgment.

That motion was granted by the

district court on May 24, 1990.

(A copy of the Order of Partial

Summary Judgment is attached as Addendum A.)

The court found

that, as a matter of law, the purchase price identified in the
agreement between First Security and Capitol "shall be adjusted
downward in the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00)."
Record at 39 8.
In June 1990, Zions assigned its interest in the
agreement to the appellant, 4447 Associates.

4447 Associates was

subsequently substituted as the sole party plaintiff.3
On January 6 and 7, 1991, the remaining issues in the
case were tried before the Honorable Frank G. Noel.

On

January 30, 1992, Judge Noel issued a memorandum decision holding
that the plaintiff, 4447 Associates, "failed to prove that First
Security received sufficient notice of the assignment, as
required by law," to preclude it from satisfying its debt with
the original creditor, Capitol. Memorandum Decision at 8 (a copy

3

The court reserved until after any appeal the issue of
First Security's right to collect attorneys' fees in this matter
from Zions, the original plaintiff. Record at 783.
4

of the Memorandum Decision is attached as Addendum B).

On

September 25, 1992, the court entered Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ("Findings").
attached as Addendum C.)

(A copy of the Findings is

Judgment was entered in favor of First

Security on November 3, 1992. On December 2, 1992, 4447
Associates filed its notice of appeal from the district court's
judgment.
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
After a two-day trial, the district court made the

following findings of fact:
1.

First Security Financial ("First Security") and

Capitol Thrift & Loan Company ("Capitol") were parties to an
Asset Purchase Agreement and a Closing Agreement dated
December 10, 1982, and December 13, 1982, respectively.

Findings

(Addendum C) at 1 1. These two documents are collectively
referred to by the district court and hereafter in this brief as
the "Purchase Agreements."
2.

Pursuant to the Purchase Agreements, First

Security purchased certain assets from Capitol.

The Asset

Purchase Agreement provided that First Security would pay Capitol
$1,007,777.42 on December 13, 1985. The Purchase Agreements also
provided for quarterly interest payments to be paid from First
Security to Capitol in the amount of $25,194.44.
1 2.

5

Findings at

3.

The Purchase Agreements also provided that the sum

of $1,007,777.42 due on December 13, 1985, was subject to an
offset amount not to exceed $1,000,000.00.
4.

Findings at 1 3.

Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson") was the

president, chief operating officer, and a director of First
Security from the time of its inception in December 19 82 through
November 1984. He was also president and chief executive officer
of Capitol until June 1984.
5.

Findings at 1 4.

From December 1982 to and including September 27,

1984, First Security paid its quarterly interest installments to
Capitol.

Findings at 1 5.
6.

In June 1984, the shareholders of Capitol,

including Christenson, sold all of their Capitol stock to AFS
Holding Company, an affiliate of the Bertagnole Investment
Company.

In June 1984, Christenson ceased, for a period of time,

to have any ownership interests in Capitol, and ceased to
function as an officer or director.
7.

Findings at 1 6.

In the summer of 1984, Capitol owed Zions First

National Bank ("Zions") approximately $870,000 on a revolving
line of credit.

This line of credit was unsecured.

Findings at

1 7.
8*

On or about September 28, 1984, Emanuel A. Floor,

acting as president of Capitol, and Zions executed an Assignment
and Security Agreement, giving Zions a security interest in
Capitol's receivable owing on the Purchase Agreements and
6

directing Capitol to place First Security on notice of the
Assignment and Security Agreement,

This Assignment and Security

Agreement ("Assignment") was given to secure a one-million-dollar
note, dated September 28, 1984, which Capitol executed in favor
of Zions. The purpose of this note was to refinance the $870,000
obligation which was previously owed to Zions by Capitol.
Findings at \ 8.
9.

Christenson personally guaranteed the

September 28, 1984 Note up to $870,000.
10.

Findings at 1 9.

For the purposes of giving notice to First

Security concerning matters relating to the Asset Purchase
Agreement, the only address provided to Capitol by First Security
was:
First Security Financial
P.O. Box 30006
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
ATTN: Treasurer
Between December 1982 and July 1985, any mail sent to this
address would have been delivered to Elmer Tucker.

Findings at

1 10.
11.

Elmer Tucker was the treasurer of First Security

from its inception through and beyond July 10, 1985.

Findings at

1 11.
12.

Emanuel A. Floor in his capacity as president of

Capitol executed a Notice of Assignment on or about September 28,

7

1984.

That Notice of Assignment was mailed to First Security but

was never received by First Security.4
13.

Findings at 1 12.

Elmer Tucker never received the notice signed by

Mr. Floor, and was never made aware of the Assignment until 1986.
Findings at 1 13.
14.

No individual representing or authorized to act on

behalf of First Security received written notice of the
Assignment prior to 1986.
15.

Findings at 1 14.

No one acting on behalf of Zions sent written

notice of the Assignment to First Security prior to 1986, nor did
Zions communicate with First Security regarding the Assignment at
any time between September 8, 1984, and July 10, 1985.

Findings

at 1 15.
16.

Zions never received written acknowledgment from

First Security that First Security had received notice of the
Assignment or notice of any purported obligation to pay any
monies under the receivable to Zions.
17.

Findings at 1 16.

On September 28, 1984, Christenson was president,

chief executive officer, and a director of First Security
Financial.

At that same time, he was not an officer, director,

4

The testimony at trial was that Mr. Floor did not actually
mail the notice himself. Rather, he signed the document "and
then someone else took care of delivery." Transcript at 138. No
testimony was offered at trial concerning the identity of the
individual who actually mailed the document, nor that the
document was in fact mailed.
8

or employee, nor had he any ownership interests in Capitol.
Findings at 1 17.
18.

To the extent that Allen Potts ("Potts"), an

employee of Zions, discussed with Christenson the Assignment, the
discussions were primarily of an intent by Zions to enter into
the agreement, all of which discussions preceded execution of the
Assignment by Capitol and Zions.
19.

Findings at 1 18.

Capitol did not default on its obligations secured

by the Assignment until at least December 1985.

Findings at

1 19-

20.

The Assignment and Security Agreement, and the

Notice of Assignment signed by Mr. Floor both stated that First
Security was obligated to make all payments owing under the
receivable payable jointly to Capitol and Zions during the entire
term of the Purchase Agreement.5

Zions never received directly

from First Security any of the quarterly interest payments it
claims to have been entitled to under the Assignment.

Findings

at 1 20.
21.

Zions received interest and principal payments on

the Capitol loan directly from Bertagnole individuals or
entities.

Findings at 1 21.

^ith regard to the Notice of Assignment, the district court
found that First Security did not receive the Notice. Findings
at 1 12. With regard to the Assignment and Security Agreement,
First Security was not a party to that agreement and there was no
testimony at trial that Christensen was aware of the specific
terms of the agreement.
9

22.

Zions never attempted to collect any amounts from

First Security under the Assignment until after December of 1985.
Findings at 1 22.
23.

Prior to July 19 85, Christenson delivered on two

separate occasions his personal financial statements to the
president of First Security, Bud Cummings.

Paragraph 3 of each

of those financial statements reads as follows:
This represents my portion of the ownership
of Capitol Thrift & Loan based on the
contract amount I have with First Security
Financial. This receivable has been pledged
to Zions First National Bank.
Findings at 1 23.
24.

A third financial statement containing the

identical paragraph 3 referenced above was delivered by
Christenson's attorney to First Security's attorneys prior to
July 1985.

Findings at 1 24.

25.

On or about July 10, 1985, First Security,

Christenson and Capitol entered into that certain Settlement
Agreement, Mutual Release, and Covenant Not To Sue, whereby First
Security's obligations to Capitol were satisfied in full.

See

Findings at 1 25.
26.

In late 1986, 4447 Associates borrowed over three

million dollars from Zions, and used those proceeds to purchase,
among other things, a participation interest in the Capitol note,
which included a security interest in the collateral for the
note, First Security's receivable.
10

In June 1990, Zions assigned

to 4447 Associates all of its ownership interests in the Capitol
loan and the First Security receivable.

Findings at 1 26.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY RULED THAT BECAUSE FIRST
SECURITY DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION TO PAY ZIONS, IT WAS
ENTITLED TO SATISFY IT OBLIGATIONS SOLELY WITH CAPITOL, THE
ORIGINAL CREDITOR.
The district court expressly found that First Security

did not receive notification of the assignment and the
instruction to make payments to Capitol's assignee, Zions. The
court applied the proper legal standard, and its factual findings
are not clearly erroneous.

Therefore, this court should affirm

the district court's judgment.

Given the finding that First

Security did not receive notification, First Security was
entitled by statute to satisfy its obligation with the original
account creditor, Capitol.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE
MUST BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD BY $1,000,000.
Even if First Security were liable to 4447 Associates,

the district court correctly held that the purchase price must be
adjusted downward by one million dollars according to the plain
language of the Purchase Agreements.6 The argument put forth by
4447 Associates is contrary to the unambiguous language of the
Purchase Agreements and to common sense.

6

This court needs to address this issue only if it
determines that the judgment of the district court must be
reversed on the issue of notification.
11

ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY HELD THAT BECAUSE FIRST SECURITY
DID NOT RECEIVE NOTIFICATION TO PAY ZIONS, IT WAS ENTITLED
TO SATISFY ITS OBLIGATIONS SOLELY WITH CAPITOL, THE ORIGINAL
CREDITOR.
The district court held:
The court is of the opinion that under
the circumstances of this case it was
necessary for First Security to actually
receive notice of the pledge of the
collateral before it could be burdened with a
legal obligation to make payments under the
Asset Purchase Agreement to the assignee,
that is Zions. The notice must be sufficient
so that someone in the position of First
Security must rely with some degree of
certainty on the notice to begin making
payments under the contract to someone other
than the obligee. First Security was
obligated to make payments to someone. To
make those payments to someone other than the
original obligee would put them at risk and
may eventually result in their having to pay
twice under the contract. Therefore, some
vague notice that the contract had been
pledged as collateral was not, in the Court's
opinion, sufficient notice. In addition, a
pledge of collateral may mean at least one of
two things. It may mean that the payments
under the contract at the time of the
assignment were to be made to the assignee,
or it may mean that an effort to collect on
the contract by the assignee would not be
made until the assignor defaulted on it's
[sic] obligation. First Security cannot be
left to guess as to whom they must make their
payments.

It is worth noting again that a pledge of a
note as collateral does not necessarily mean
that the obligor is obligated to immediately
begin making payments under the obligation to
the assignee of the obligation. Indeed the
conduct of the parties clearly demonstrates
12

to the Court that Zions did not intend to
receive payments under the Asset Purchase
Agreement from First Security until Capitol
defaulted on the loan.
Memorandum Decision (Addendum B) at 3-4, 7.

The district court

specifically held that rfit was necessary for First Security to
actually receive notice of the pledge of the collateral before it
could be burdened with a legal obligation to make payments under
the asset purchase agreement to the assignee, that is Zions."
Id. at 3.

4447 Associates had the burden of proof at trial. The

district court held that 4447 Associates had not met this burden
and had failed to prove that First Security received notification
of the assignment.

Id. at 8.

As set forth below, the decision of the district court
should not be overturned.
proper legal standard.

First, the district court applied the

Second, its factual findings are

accurate, or at the very least cannot be shown to be clearly
erroneous.
A.

The District Court Properly Held That Section 70A-9-318
Requires Actual Receipt of Notification.
The district court properly held that this case is

governed by section 70A-9-318 of the Utah Code.

That statute

provides:
The account debtor is authorized to pay the
assignor until the account debtor receives
notification that the amount due or to become
due has been assigned and that payment is to
be made to the assignee.

13

Utah Code Ann, § 70A-9-318(3) (1990) (emphasis added).
case, First Security was the account debtor.

In this

Under the plain

language of section 70A-9-318, First Security was entitled to pay
its creditor, Capitol, until it received notification of two
things:

(1) that Capitol had assigned the contract to Zions, and

(2) that payment was to be made to the Zions.

Id.

The district

court did not err in ruling that the plain language of this
statute applies here.
In an effort to convince this court to reverse the
judgment of the district court, 4447 Associates argues that
"Zions was not required to provide actual notice to First
Security to make all future payments to Zions."

Brief of

Appellants at 22. 4447 Associates goes so far as to argue that
"Section 70A-1-201(25-27), rather than Section 70A-9-318, governs
the manner of giving notices of assignments of contract rights."
Id. at 26 (emphasis added).

As demonstrated below, both of these

arguments are frivolous and should be rejected by this court.
1.

In the Absence of Receipt of Notification, First
Security Was Entitled To Satisfy Its Obligation To
Its Original Creditor, Capitol.

4447 Associates makes the argument that "Zions was not
required to notify First Security where or to whom it should pay
money under the Purchase Agreements."

Brief of Appellants at 24.

See also id. at 22. 4447 Associates argues that notice was not
required because the assignment granted Capitol the right to

14

continue to collect the balance due.7

This is precisely the

point relied upon by First Security and by the district court.
Because, as 4447 Associates points out, "Capitol had the right to
continue to collect the balance due," First Security was entitled
to deal with Capitol in extinguishing its debt until it received
notification to the contrary.
Under the express terms of the Utah statute, until
First Security received notification to make the payments to
Zions, First Security was entitled to satisfy its obligations
with Capitol, the original creditor.
its peril.

Zions failed to do so at

In a similar case, the Utah Supreme Court held that

"absent notice, it is to be noted that the claims of the Bank, as
assignee, were subject to any defense the Church, as account
debtor, had against Cook, as assignor, 70A-9-313(1)(a)."

Bank of

Salt Lake v. Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 534 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1975).

In

this case, First Security entered into a settlement agreement

7

4447 Associates even cites the case of Jack B. Parson Cos.
v. Nield for the proposition that when an assignment is made for
purpose of security only (as this one was), the assignment has
"'no significance whatever once the loan was paid.'" 751 P.2d
1131, 1133 (Utah 1988) (quoting Jeffs v. Citizens Fin. Co., 319
P.2d 858, 858 (Utah 1958). See Brief of Appellants at 23. 4447
Associates points out that this case does not involve the
assignment of real estate, as does Jack B. Parson Cos. Id. at
24, n.68. However, if the Jack B. Parson Cos. case applies at
all, it establishes that the assignment in this case should be
"treated as a mortgage" and that the assignment has "no
significance whatever" now that the debt has been paid. Jack B.
Parson Cos.. 751 P.2d at 1133.
15

with Capitol that fully extinguished First Security's debt.
Absent receipt of notification by First Security prior to the
time the settlement agreement was entered into, 4447 Associates,
as the successor in interest to Zions, is subject to the defense
that the debt has been completely satisfied.
The district court's decision in this case is supported
not only by the clear language of the statute, but by sound
public policy.

It is fundamentally unfair to require First

Security to pay its debt twice when Zions took no steps to ensure
that First Security received notification that payments should be
made to Zions.

There was testimony at trial that the practice

"normally" followed by Zions when sending notice of an assignment
was to "send [the debtor] a letter and ask for their
acknowledgement."

Transcript at 106. Mr. Potts of Zions

testified that "when you got [the acknowledgement] back that's
when you decided to sign it."

Id.

This testimony makes clear

that the rule of law contained in the UCC and followed by the
district court does not impose an undue burden upon assignees.
Indeed, the rule, if followed, avoids the very type of dispute
now before the court in which an assignee is contending that a
debtor should have to pay a debt twice.

The UCC is based upon

the sound public policy that the debtor must actually receive
notification of the assignment and the duty to pay the assignee.
It is an easy matter for the assignee to ensure that
receipt is received.

For example, the assignee can send the
16

letter by registered mail, or it can follow the practice
"normally" followed by Zions in requesting an acknowledgment.
In this case, the court found that Zions not only
failed to send a notice by registered mail or to request an
acknowledgement, but that Zions did not send any kind of a
written notification.

Findings (Addendum C) at 1 15. The

district court found further that Zions did not even communicate
with First Security regarding the assignment between the time the
assignment was executed and the time First Security settled its
debt with Capitol.

The court found:

"[N]or did Zions

communicate with First Security regarding the Assignment at any
time between September 8, 19 84 [a date prior to the Assignment]
and July 10, 1985 [the date of the Settlement Agreement]."

Id.

Given the lack of notification or communication from Zions during
the relevant time period, First Security was free--as a matter of
law-- to satisfy its obligation with its original account
creditor.
2.

By Statute, the Determinative Question Is Not
Whether Zions Gave Notice But Whether First
Security Received Notification.

4447 Associates spends much of its brief arguing that
Zions gave notice to First Security of the Assignment.

First, as

noted above, the district court found that precisely the opposite
is true. As quoted above, the district court found:

"No one

acting on behalf of Zions sent written notice of the assignment
to First Security prior to 1986, nor did Zions communicate with
17

First Security regarding the Assignment at any time between
September 8, 1984 and July 10, 1985."

Findings at 1 15. Second,

as set forth below, even if the district court's factual finding
that notice of the assignment was not given is clearly erroneous,
the judgment in favor of First Security must be affirmed.

As a

matter of law, the question is not whether Zions gave notice of
the assignment but whether First Security received notification.
Furthermore, it is not enough for First Security to receive
notification of the assignment alone.

By statute, First Security

must receive notification of both (1) the assignment and (2) the
duty to pay Zions.
4447 Associates argues that "evidence that a notice is
sent, regardless of some evidence of non-receipt, is sufficient
to comply with section 70A-2-201(26)."
n.76.

Brief of Appellants at 26

4447 Associates cites as support for this argument the

case of Chrysler Dodge Country, USA v. Curley. 782 P.2d 536 (Utah
Ct. App. 1989) . As pointed out by 4447 Associates, the Utah
Court of Appeals held in Chrysler Dodge that "it is not necessary
that the debtor actually receive notice, merely that the notice
is sent to an address where the creditor can reasonably expect to
reach the debtor."

Id. at 541. However, what 4447 Associates

fails to tell this court is that the Chrysler Dodge case involves
a completely different section of the UCC than the one governing
this case.

Chrysler Dodge dealt with the question of whether

sale of a repossessed truck had been handled in a commercially
18

reasonable manner.

Section 70A-9-504(3) governs the disposition

of collateral and states:
[U]nless collateral is perishable or
threatens to decline speedily in value or is
of type customarily sold on a recognized
market, reasonable notification of the time
and place of any public sale or reasonable
notification of the time after which any
private sale or other intended disposition is
to be made shall be sent by the secured party
to the debtor.
Because the statute in the Chrysler Dodge case required that
notice "shall be sent," that case has no applicability to the
case before this court.

In this case, the UCC requires not that

notice be sent, but that notification be received.

4447

Associates stipulated before trial, and the district court found,
that First Security had not received the Notice of the assignment
executed by Mr. Floor.

Nor did First Security receive any other

notification from Zions.
Even though 4447 Associates stipulated that the Notice
itself was not received, 4447 Associates argues that certain
circumstances should have put First Security on sufficient notice
of the assignment.

In particular, 4447 Associates argues that

First Security's president, Richard Christenson, had notice of
the assignment.

First, any notice Christenson had was not

received by him in his capacity as an officer or director of
First Security but in his individual capacity in his business
dealings with Zions. Thus, even assuming knowledge on
Christenson's part, that knowledge would not be imputed to First
19

Security.

Second, the district court found that the discussions

involving Christenson were primarily of an intent to enter into
an assignment.

Third, the financial statements of Richard

Christenson (which he provided to First Security) contain no
notice that payments should be made to Zions.

Findings at 1 18.

Thus, at the most, any notice that Christenson had went only to
the first of the two requirements in section 70A-9-318(3).

There

was no evidence at trial that First Security received
notification of the duty to pay Zions.
As shown below, awareness of an intent to enter into an
assignment--whether obtained through Christenson or otherwise--is
not sufficient to prevent First Security from dealing with its
original creditor.

Further, even notification of an actual

assignment is not sufficient--a debtor must also receive
notification that it is to pay the assignee.
a.

Knowledge of an Anticipated Assignment Does
not Impose any Duty on First Security.

4447 Associates repeatedly argues that First Security
was aware of the Assignment.

However, as the district court

noted, these discussions "were primarily of an intent by Zions to
enter into the Agreement, all of which discussions preceded
execution of the Assignment by Capitol and Zions."
1 18 (emphasis in original).

Findings at

Thus 4447 Associates failed to meet

its burden of proof.

20

As the district court noted, "First Security cannot be
left to guess as to whom to make their payments."
Decision at 4.

Memorandum

Notice of an intent to enter into an Assignment

Agreement "alone would not be sufficient to put First Security on
notice of the Assignment and to trigger the obligation of First
Security to begin making payment to Zions."

Id. at 6.

4447

Associates argues that Christenson, who was the president of
First Security, had notice of the assignment and that
Christenson's knowledge is imputed to First Security.

However,

as noted above, "the discussions were primarily of an intent by
Zions to enter into the agreement."
added).

Findings at 1 18 (emphasis

Furthermore, "all" of the discussions "preceeded

execution of the Assignment by Capitol and Zions."

Id. Mere

knowledge of an anticipated assignment (which is the absolute
most that 4447 Associates proved at trial) is, as a matter of
law, insufficient under section 70A-0-318(3).
b.

Knowledge of An Assignment Alone Does Not
Impose a Duty Upon First Security to Make
Payments to Zions or to settle the debt with
Zions.

Even assuming that Christenson's knowledge should be
imputed to First Security and even assuming that Christenson knew
that the intended assignment had actually been executed,
knowledge of an actual assignment is insufficient.

As 4447

Associates notes in its own brief, the Assignment in this case
allowed Capitol to "continue to collect the debt owed by First
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Security."

Brief of Appellants at 24. 4447 Associates argues in

its brief that to notify First Security "where or to whom it
should pay money under the purchase agreements . . . would be
contrary to the express terms of the purchase agreements and
customary commercial practice."8

Id.

Thus, 4447 Associates

tacitly acknowledges that Zions did not "require that payments be
made to Zions." Accordingly, at the very most, First Security
(including Christenson) had notice of the assignment.

Even

assuming that First Security was completely aware of the actual
execution of the Assignment (and not just the intent to enter
into the assignment, as the district court found), notice of the
Assignment alone would not impose a duty upon First Security to
begin making payments to Zions. There is no evidence that
Christenson was aware of the actual terms of the assignment.

He

was not a party to it, and 4447 Associates--which had the burden
of proof at trial--points to no evidence in the record that
Christenson even saw or read the actual assignment document.
Throughout its brief, 4447 Associates repeatedly
ignores the dual requirements of section 70A-9-318. Not only
must First Security receive notification of the Assignment, it

8

4447 Associates' position is inconsistent. It argues that
is would have been commercially unreasonable for Zions to give
First Security notice, yet it argues that this is precisely what
Zions did. Furthermore, even if Zions did not wish to notify
First Security to make payments to Zions (because Zions had
agreed to allow Capitol to continue to collect the payments),
Zions should at least have notified First Security that First
Security should not settle the debt with Capitol.
22

must receive notification of the duty to begin making payments to
Zions.

The statute provides that First Security was authorized

to continue to pay its creditor until it received notification
that the debt

!!

ha[d] been assigned and that payment is to be made

to the assignee."

Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990).

The

district court's ruling on this point was correct and should be
affirmed by this court.
As noted by the trial court, "First Security cannot be
left to guess as to whom they must make their payments."
Memorandum Decision at 4.

This is the reason that the

legislature has required actual receipt of notification.

The

rationale behind such a statutory rule has been explained by the
Utah Supreme Court.

In the case of Time Finance Corporation v.

Johnson Trucking Company, 458 P.2d 1873 (Utah 1969), the supreme
court quoted with approval the following language:
The fact, however, of such substitution of a
new creditor must, in order to make the
debtor liable to the assignee, be brought
home to the debtor with much exactness and
certainty before he has paid the debt. The
rule of notice to him is much more stringent
than that which may defeat the title of a
purchaser of a chose in action or of real
estate. The latter is free to purchase or
refuse to purchase as he chooses, and
therefore it is his duty, before acting to
trace out any reasonable doubt and to inform
himself of the true facts as soon as anything
arises to put him on inquiry. But the debtor
is not so situated. He must pay to his
original creditor when the debt is due unless
he can establish affirmatively that someone
else has a better right. The notice to him
therefore must be of so exact and specific a
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character as to convince him that he is no
longer liable to such original creditor.
4447 Associates argues that the Time Finance case should be
distinguished because it was decided in the context of the right
to receipt of insurance proceeds.
without a difference.

However, this is a distinction

4447 Associates has offered no reason that

the sound policies embodied in Time Finance do not apply in this
context.

More fundamentally, the language of section 70A-9-318

controls here and is clear:

First Security was entitled to pay

its original creditor until it "receive[d] notification" that
(1) the assignment had been made and (2) payments were to be made
directly to the assignee.

Thus, the law applied by the district

court is based on the Utah statute.

Time Finance merely explains

the policies behind a rule such as the one codified in the
statute.

Even if this court does as 4447 Associates requests and

"entirely disregard[s] Time Finance," Brief of Appellants at 35,
the court must affirm the decision of the lower court.9
3.

The Definitions in Chapter One of the UCC Do Not
Provide Substantive Rules of Law.

4447 Associates argues at length that notice was given
to First Security as contemplated in section 70A-1-201 of the

9

4447 Associates argues that First Security had a duty to
inquire. However, the statute imposes no such duty. The only
duty is the duty of Zions to ensure that First Security "receives
notification." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1990). This duty
is easily discharged by sending notification by registered mail
or by following the practice "normally" followed by Zions of
requesting an acknowledgement. See Transcript at 106.
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Utah Code.

In fact, 4447 Associates goes so far as to argue that

"Section 70A-1-201(25-27), rather than Section 70A-9-318. governs
the manner of giving notices of assignments of contract rights."
Brief of Appellants at 26 (emphasis added).
the cart before the horse.

This argument puts

Section 70A-1-201 of the Utah Code is

entitled "General Definitions."

It is relevant only if terms

that are defined in that section are used elsewhere in the
Uniform Commercial Code.
substantive rules of law.

The definitions provide no independent
Thus, this court does not even need to

refer to section 70A-1-201 unless an applicable substantive
provision contains a term that is defined in chapter one of the
UCC.
In this case, the district court properly began its
analysis by considering the substantive statutory provision.
That provision is section 70A-9-318, which requires that First
Security "receives notification."
Once a court has analyzed the applicable statutory
provision (section 70A-9-318), then the court should look to the
definitions contained in section 70A-1-201 for additional
guidance as to the definition of terms used in section 70A-9-318.
In this case, section 70A-1-201(26)(b) provides guidance as to
the term "receives notification," which is used in section
70A-9-318.

Section 70A-1-201(26)(b) provides:

A person receives a notice or notification
when:
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(i) it comes to his attention; or
(ii) it is duly delivered at the
place of business through which the
contract was made or at any other place
held out by him as the place for receipt
of such communications.
This is the only definitional section that applies in
this case.

Under this definition First Security did not

"receive[] notification" that the contract "has been assigned and
that payment is to be made to the assignee."

Utah Code Ann.

§ 70A-9-318 (1990) . The notification neither came to First
Security's attention10 nor was it duly delivered to First
Security's place of business.

Furthermore, as set forth above,

even if Christenson's knowledge of the anticipated assignment is
imputed to First Security, the notification to pay Zions did not
"come[] to his attention."
In a related argument 4447 Associates asserts at length
that First Security had "notice" of the Assignment under the
definition of notice in subsection 25 of section 70A-1-201. That
section provides:
A person has "notice" of a fact when: (i) he
has actual knowledge of it; (ii) he has
received a notice or notification of it; or
(iii) from all of the facts and circumstances
to him at the time in question he has reason
to know that it exists.

10

As pointed out above, there is no evidence that Christenson
had any knowledge of the specific terms of the assignment.
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First, as pointed out above, notice of an assignment alone does
not impose any duty on First Security.

Moreover, as a matter of

law, the question in this case is not whether First Security (or
Christenson) had notice of an assignment alone, but whether First
Security received notification of both the assignment and the
duty to make payments to Zions. Accordingly, the definitional
sections relied upon so heavily by 4447 Associates simply do not
apply in this instance.

Subsection 25 provides a definition of

when a person has notice.

The district court correctly held that

the question is not whether Zions gave notice but whether First
Security received notification.
4447 Associates also repeatedly argues that First
Security had "reason to know" of the Assignment and of Zions'
interest in the agreement between First Security and Capitol.
However, the "reason to know" standard does not apply in this
case.

The reason to know standard is contained in the

definitional section of the UCC regarding notice quoted above.
In that section, the legislature states that a person has notice
of a fact if he has reason to know of it. As already
established, the statute does not require the giving of notice
but the receipt of notification.

The definitional sections

relied upon by 4447 Associates simply do not apply in this case.
4.

Summary.

In summary, the district court applied the proper rule
of law.

Section 70A-9-318 of the Utah Code is clear and
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unequivocal.

Unless First Security received notification that it

was to pay money directly to Zions, it was free to settle its
obligations with its original creditor, Capitol.

This court

should not reverse the legal determinations made by the lower
court.
B.

The Trial Court Properly Found That First Security
Did Not Receive Notification As Required By Section
70A-9-318.
Inasmuch as the district court applied the correct rule

of law, its judgment may be reversed only if its factual findings
are clearly erroneous.
467, 470 (Utah 1989).

Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d
The district court found that First

Security did not receive notification of the assignment and of
the duty to make payments to Zions. This finding should not be
overturned by this court for two important reasons.

First, 4447

Associates has not marshaled the evidence as required when
seeking to overturn the factual finding of a trial court.
Second, even if 4447 Associates had marshaled the evidence, the
district court's finding was not clearly erroneous.
1.

4447 Associates Has Not Marshaled the Evidence
and Therefore the Factual Findings of the District
Court Must Be Affirmed.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides:
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard
shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.
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Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

A finding is clearly erroneous only if it

is "against the clear weight of the evidence."

Reed v. Mutual of

Omaha Insurance Company. 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989).

The

Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly noted that
As a prerequisite to an appellant's attack on
findings of fact, appellant must marshal all
the evidence in support of the findings and
demonstrate 'that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings.'
Grayson Roper Limited v. Finlinson. 782 P.2d 467, 470 (Utah
1989) . As the Utah Court of Appeals has noted:
The marshaling requirement provides the
appellate court the basis from which to
conduct a meaningful and expedient review of
facts challenged on appeal.
Robb v. Anderton. 225 Utah Adv. Rep. 22, 25 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
If an appellant does not meet his marshaling burden but rather
selects only evidence favorable to his position without
presenting the evidence supporting the trial court's finding, the
appellate court will affirm the finding of the lower court.

Id.

In this case, 4447 Associates argues repeatedly that
First Security received notice of its duty to pay Zions. This
argument is contrary to the express findings of the trial court
as supported by the evidence at trial, which is discussed in the
next section of this brief.

The court found that a notice was

mailed to First Security by Mr. Floor on behalf of Capitol but
that "Elmer Tucker [of First Security] never received the notice
signed by Mr. Floor, and was never made aware of the Assignment
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until 1986."

Findings at 1 13.

In addition, the court found

that "[n]o individual representing or authorized to act on behalf
of First Security received written notice of the Assignment prior
to 1986."

Id. at 1 14. Further, the court found that "no one

acting on behalf of Zions sent written notice of the Assignment
to First Security prior to 1986, nor did Zions communicate with
First Security regarding the Assignment at any time between
September 8, 1984, and July 10, 1985."

Id. at 1 15. By arguing

that First Security received notice, 4447 Associates is arguing
that the district court's factual findings were clearly
erroneous.

However, 4447 Associates has cited to this appellate

court only the portions of the evidence favorable to its
position.

Because 4447 Associates did not marshal the evidence,

this court should affirm the factual findings of the district
court.
2.

The Factual Findings of the District Court are not
Clearly Erroneous.

Even if 4447 Associates had marshaled the evidence as
required, this court would have to affirm the lower court's
decision because its findings of fact were not against the clear
weight of the evidence.

It is true, as 4447 Associates points

out, that testimony was presented at trial that Mr. Potts, on
behalf of Zions, had a notice mailed to First Security.

However,

the trial court rejected this testimony when it found that "[n]o
one acting on behalf of Zions sent written notice of the
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Assignment to First Security prior to 1986, nor did Zions
communicate with First Security regarding the Assignment at any
time between September 8, 1984, and July 10, 1985. " n

Id. at

J 14. The trial court's decision is adequately supported by the
record.

For example, although Mr. Potts testified at trial that

he instructed his secretary to mail the notice, he had stated
previously under oath that he did not mail the notice. Also,
when asked at his deposition whether he recalled "mailing the
notice" and whether he "personally deposit[ed] it in the mail,"
he responded:
years ago."

"Obviously, I can't remember what happened six

Transcript at 65.

In addition, Mr. Tucker of First

Security stated unequivocally at trial that he never received the
notice and that any notice sent to the address listed on the
notice would have reached him under the normal routing policies
of First Security.
The district court found Mr. Potts's trial testimony to
be not credible for two reasons.
purported notice.

First, there is no copy of the

Second, prior statements of Mr. Potts

contradicted his trial testimony.

n

The court held:

In its brief, 4447 Associates sets forth a list of facts
that it alleges are "undisputed in the record from the trial
court." Brief of Appellant at 6. 4447 Associates claims that it
is undisputed that "Potts [an employee of Zions] mailed a copy of
the Notice to First Security." Brief of Appellant at 11.
However, as pointed out above, not only was this fact disputed at
trial, but the district court specifically found that Potts did
not mail the notice to First Security. Findings at 5 14.
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Mr. Potts also testified that he recalled
sending a written notice of the Assignment to
First Security. There is, however, no copy
of such notice and prior statements by
Mr. Potts on this issue seemed to suggest
otherwise. The court finds that First
Security did not receive written notice of
the Assignment from Zions, and further finds
that written notice was not sent to First
Security from Zions' employees.
In light of the clear testimony that First Security did not
receive the notice and in light of Mr. Potts' prior statements
suggesting that no notice was sent, it was not clearly erroneous
for the district court to find that First Security did not
receive notice.

Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court

must be affirmed.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE
MUST BE ADJUSTED DOWNWARD BY ONE MILLION DOLLARS
The second main point raised on appeal by 4447

Associates is that the district court erred in granting partial
summary judgment in favor of First Security on the issue of
whether the purchase price should be adjusted downward by
$1,000,000.

As an initial matter, First Security notes that the

court does not need to reach this issue if it affirms the
decision of the district court on the issue of whether First
Security received notification.

Because First Security did not

receive notification as required by the statute, it was free to
settle its obligation with the original obligor.

It is

undisputed that First Security did in fact settle the obligation
with Capitol.

This is a complete defense to any collection
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attempts by Zions or by its successor in interest, 4447
Associates.
If the court reverses the decision of the lower court
and holds that First Security must be required to pay the debt to
4447 Associates even though it has satisfied the obligation
already, then the amount due to 4447 Associates must be adjusted
downward by one million dollars.

4447 Associates argues that the

district court improperly interpreted the Closing Agreement and
used the wrong date when it granted partial summary judgment in
favor of First Security.

However, 4447 Associates' argument is

contrary to the unambiguous and express terms of the Closing
Agreement.
In arguing that the district court misread the Asset
Purchase Agreement, 4447 Associates does not quote the entire
portion of the relevant part of the Asset Purchase Agreement.
particular, 4447 Associates leaves out the important first
sentence.

The entire paragraph reads:
At the end of the three (3) year period
of deferral and prior to the payment of the
principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price, the real estate and
receivables of Capitol acquired by FS
Financial shall be valued in the manner set
forth below. In the event that (i) the
aggregate value of the real estate is less
than its book value as of the Closing Date
and/or (ii) the actual and anticipated losses
on the collection of the amount of the
receivables as of the Closing Date exceeds
the reserve for losses as of the Closing
Date, the principal amount of the deferred
portion of the purchase price shall be
33

In

adjusted downward in an equivalent amount.
Further, the principal amount of the deferred
portion of the purchase price shall also be
adjusted downward in the amount of any
liabilities of Capitol relating to the
collection of receivables which were incurred
in the normal course of business prior to
Closing but were not disclosed on Capitol's
balance sheet at Closing and which were
assumed by FS Financial hereunder. The
aggregate of such downward adjustments of the
principal amount of the deferred portion of
the purchase price shall in no event exceed
One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00).
Notwithstanding any such downward adjustments
of the principal amount of the deferred
portion of the purchase price, there shall be
no adjustment of the amount of interest paid
by FS financial under Paragraph 2(C) hereof
during the three (3) year period.
(Emphasis added.)
This language is clear.

The parties agreed that three

years after the Closing Date, the parties would determine the
actual and anticipated losses on the collection (as of the third
anniversary of the Closing Date) of the receivables that existed
on the Closing Date.

In other words, three years after closing,

the parties were to evaluate the collections that had been made
on the receivables that existed on the closing date.

4447

Associates argues that the closing date for all purposes was in
1985.

This is true.

But the closing date is not the only

relevant date.
The third year anniversary of the closing date is the
key date for valuing the collections.

If the only relevant date

were the closing date, there would be no need to evaluate the
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collections on the receivables.

If the court were to read the

paragraph as 4447 Associates urges, the only adjustment would be
for the few hours between the time the Agreement was signed and
the end of the day on the Closing Date and would reflect only
collections made on the Closing Date.
The district court properly held that the Agreement is
unambiguous.

Therefore, the only question before the court was

the amount of the losses on collection.

First Security came

forward with admissible evidence that those losses exceeded
$2,000,000.

Zions did not dispute those facts or offer any

evidence that the losses were less than $1,000,000 J2

Indeed,

4447 Associates does not argue even on appeal that the losses as
of December 13, 1985, did not exceed one million dollars but only
that the court used the improper date.

Because the court used

the proper date and because Zions did not produce any evidence to
contradict the evidence of loss submitted by First Security, the
district court properly entered partial summary judgment in favor
of First Security.

12

4447 Associates argues for the first time on appeal that
the methodology of First Security's expert was not sufficiently
explained. 4447 Associates may not raise this new issue on
appeal. Furthermore, Zions did not dispute the facts submitted
by First Security as required by Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. Nor did Zions request additional time pursuant
to Rule 56(f) to investigate the qualifications and methodology
of First Security's expert. Accordingly, 4447 Associates may not
raise these issues on appeal.
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Finally, 4447 Associates argues that First Security did
not present evidence as to the amount of the reserves on the
Closing Date.

This is an argument that was not raised before the

district court.

4447 Associates may not raise this argument for

the first time on appeal. Accordingly, this court should affirm
the order of the trial court granting partial summary judgment in
favor of First Security.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, First Security Financial
respectfully requests that this court affirm the decision of the
district court in this case.
DATED this

'

day of December, 1993.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

'A

^ —

Brent D. Wride
Attorneys for First Security
Financial, Defendant Appellee
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KENT H. MURDOCK (A2350)
MARK 0. MORRIS (A4636) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
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Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a National Banking
Association,

ORDER OF PARTIAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,
a Utah corporation,

Civil No. C87-1578
Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant.
ooOoo
Defendant First Security Financial's motion for partial
summary judgment came before this Court for regularly scheduled
hearing on Friday, May 4, 1990, at 9:00 a.m.

Defendant First

Security Financial was represented by Mark O. Morris.

Plaintiff

Zions First National Bank was represented by Jeffrey M. Jones
and Craig H. Christensen.

After having reviewed the pleadings

and other papers on file, and after having considered the arguments
of counsel and the affidavit filed in connection therewith,
this Court is of the opinion that the December 10, 1982 Asset

00397

Purchase Agreement and the December 13, 1982 Closing Agreement
are unambiguous as to the relevant points raised by First Security
Financial's motion, that there are no genuine issues of any
material fact, and that defendant First Security Financial is
entitled to partial summary judgment as a matter of law.
Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the
principal amount of the deferred portion of the purchase price
of Capital Thrift and Loan Company, as that principal amount
of the deferred portion of the purchase price is identified
in paragraph 2 of the December 10, 1982 Asset Purchase Agreement
(attached as Exhibit "A" to plaintiff's Complaint) and in paragraph
3 of the December 13, 1982 Closing Agreement (attached as Exhibit
"B" to plaintiff's Complaint) shall be adjusted downward in
the amount of One Million Dollars ($1,000,000.00).
DATED this

<L

day of May, 1990.
BY THE COURT:

<u

FranR~G. Noel
\~
District Court Judge \

-2-
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing ORDER
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was
served upon the following by hand delivering a copy of the same
this ^ " ^ day of May, 1990:
William G. Gibbs
Bruce J. Nelson
Jeffrey M. Jones
Craig H. Christensen
ALLEN, NELSON, HARDY & EVANS
215 South State
Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Case No. 870901578 CV

vs.

:

JUDGE FRANK G. NOEL

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL,

:

Plaintiff,

Defendant.

:

This matter was tried
1992.

to the Court January

6, and 7,

The Court heard testimony, received evidence, heard oral

argument and now having taken the matter under advisement and
being fully advised finds and rules as follows:
The Court will not endeavor a detailed description of the
facts

of

this

case.

It

will

be

sufficient

to

state

the

following:
On the 10th day of December, 1982 Capitol Thrift and Loan
Company (Capitol) entered into an asset

purchase agreement with

First Security Financial (First Security) wherein First Security
agreed to purchase substantially all of the assets of Capitol.

At

that

time

president
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Richard

A.

Christenson

(Christenson)

and majority stockholder of Capitol.

was

the

At about that

same time Christenson became president and a director of First
Security.
their

In June

of

1984

the

stock to AFS Holding

shareholders

Company

of

Capitol

and Christenson

sold

ceased

to

have ownership interest in Capitol and ceased to function as an
officer of director.
On or about September 28, 1984 the plaintiff Zions First
National Bank (Zions) refinanced some of Capitol,s pre existing
debt to Zions in the form of a One Million Dollar (1,000,000.00)
loan.

Christenson personally guaranteed the note arising from

this loan in an amount up to $870,000.00.

As collateral for the

payment of this note Capitol pledged the receivable owing on the
purchase agreement with First Security.
Christenson's relationship with First Security terminated
shortly thereafter in November of 1984.
reaquired

an

Christenson's
between

interest

in

departure

from

Christenson

employer/employee

and

Capitol.
First

First

At

around

Security,

Security

relationship.

Christenson thereafter

In

a

arising

addition,

the

time

of

dispute

arose

out

their

of

First

Security

claimed a breach of warranties, representations and guarantees
made

by

Christenson

resolution
Security

of

under

these

entered

the

issues

into

a

asset

purchase

Christenson,
"Settlement

agreement.

Capitol

and

Agreement,

In

First
Mutual
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Release and Covenant Not To Sue" on July 10, 1985.

By virtue of

that

Capitol

agreement

First

Security

was

relieved

by

and

Christenson from any further obligations due and owing under the
asset purchase agreement.
and

other

Subsequent to this agreement Capitol

obligors defaulted

on the note

in favor of Zions.

Zions then sought to collect on the asset purchase
which

as

indicated

payment of the note.

had

been

pledged

as

collateral

agreement
for

the

The primary issue in this case is whether

First Security received notice of Capitol's pledge of the asset
purchase agreement so as to require them to make payments under
the agreement to Zions or to refrain from doing anything that
would

impair the security.

First Security

receive such notice and was therefore

claims it did not

free to extinguish, by

contract, it's obligations to Capitol under the asset purchase
agreement.
The Court is of the opinion that under the circumstances
of this case it was necessary for First Security to actually
receive notice of the pledge of the collateral before it could
be burdened with a legal obligation to make payments under the
asset purchase agreement to the assignee, that is Zions.

The

notice must be sufficient so that someone in the position of
First Security may rely with some degree of certainty on the
notice to begin making payments under the contract to someone
other than the obligee.

First Security was obligated to make

ZIONS V. FIRST SECURITY

payments to someone.
than

the

original
result

contract.

Therefore

been pledged

To make those payments to someone other

obligee

eventually

in

would

their

put

having

to

them

at

pay

risk

twice

and

may

under

the

some vague notice that the contract had

as collateral was

sufficient notice.
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not, in the

Court's opinion,

In addition a pledge of collateral may mean

at least one of two things.

It may mean that payments under the

contract at the time of the assignment were to be made to the
assignee,

or

it may

mean

that

an

effort

to

collect

on

the

contract by the assignee would not be made until the assignor
defaulted on it's obligation.

First Security cannot be left to

guess as to whom they must make their payments.

Neither does

the Court feel that First Security had an obligation of inquiry
upon being put on notice of an "assignment".

This concept has

been embraced by our Supreme Court in Time Finance Corporation
v, Johnson Trucking Company, 458 p2d 1873

(Utah 1969) wherein

the Court quoted as follows:
"The fact, however, of such substitution of a new
creditor must, in order to make the debtor liable to the
assignee, be brought home to the debtor with much
exactness and certainty before he has paid the debt. The
rule of notice to him is much more stringent than that
which may defeat the title of a purchaser of a chose in
action or of real estate. The later is free to purchase
or refuse to purchase as he chooses, and therefore it is
his duty, before acting to trace out any reasonable doubt
and to inform himself of the true facts as soon as
anything arises to put him on inquiry. But the debtor is
not so situated. He must pay to his original creditor
when the debt is due unless he can establish
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affirmatively that someone else has a better right. The
notice to him therefore must of so exact and specific a
character as to convince him that he is no longer liable
to such original creditor,....M
Plaintiff claims that notice was given to First Security
on the assignment in the following manner.
1.

Zions claims that Emanuel Floor, President of Capitol

in September of 1984, sent written notice to First Security of
the assignment.
2.
Zions,

Zions claims

called

that Allen

Christenson

to

L. Potts,

inspect

an

certain

employee

documents

of
and

discussed with him Zions intent to take the assignment.
3.

Allen L. Potts testified that he also sent a written

notice to First Security,
Zions argues that since Christenson was the president of
First Security at the time of his conversations with Potts that
these conversations put First Security on sufficient notice of
the assignment.

As to the written assignment prepared over the

signature of Emanuel Floor, it should be noted that the notice
was

purportedly

sent

to

the

attention

of

First

Security

"Treasurer" at P. 0. Box 30006 in Salt Lake City, Utah.
Tucker was the treasurer
that

address

at all relevant
would

have

times

been

Elmer

and any mail

directed

to

delivered

to

Mr.

Tucker.

The parties in this case have stipulated through the

pre trial order and the Court so finds that Mr. Tucker never did

2I0NS V. FIRST SECURITY

receive

a written

PAGE 6
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never made

aware

of the

assignment and security agreement until 1986, well after the
it#s liability to

time that First Security had extinguished
Capitol•

As to Mr. Potts7 testimony regarding his conversations
with

Mr.

Christenson

it

should

be

noted

that

these

were

primarily, according to Potts7 testimony, statements by Potts of
an intent by Zions to enter into the assignment agreement.

This

alone would not be sufficient to put First Security on notice of
the assignment and to trigger the obligation of First Security
to begin making payments to Zions.

it should be noted that Mr.

Christenson testified that he did have conversations with Mr.
Potts

around

that

period

of

time

but

does

not

recall

conversations regarding the assignment of the asset purchase
agreement.

In

fact

the

evidence

is

unclear

as

to

when

Christenson did learn of the pledge of the receiveable.

The

parties have stipulated that it occured sometime prior to July
10, 1985 but plaintiff has failed to prove that notice was given
through Christenson to First Security prior to the time that
Christenson terminated at First Security in November of 1984.

Mr.

Potts

also

testified

that

he

recalls

written notice of the assignment to First Security.

sending

a

There is

however no copy of such notice and prior statements by Mr. Potts
on this issue seemed to suggest otherwise.

The Court finds that

ZIONS V. FIRST SECURITY

PAGE 7

First Security did not receive

MEMO DECISION

written notice of the assignment

from Zions, and further finds that written notice was not sent
to First Security from Zions employees.
The plaintiff also refers the Court to certain financial
statements that, were given to First Security by Mr. Christenson
and which contain language which suggests that the "receiveable"
or asset

purchase

National

Bank.

clearly

agreement

In

the

had

been pledged

opinion

of

the

to

Court

falls short of putting First Security

Zions

this

First

language

on notice that

they then had an obligation to begin making payments under the
asset purchase agreement to Zions First National Bank.

It is

worth noting again that a pledge of a note as collateral does
not

necessarily

immediately

mean

that

the

obligor

is

obligated

to

begin making payments under the obligation to the

assignee of the obligation.

Indeed the conduct of the parties

clearly demonstrates to the Court that Zions did not intend to
receive payments under the asset purchase agreement from First
Security until Capitol defaulted on the note.
default after December of 1985.

Capitol did not

And it was not until the first

part of 1986 that Zions made any effort whatsoever to collect on
the

collateral.

Capitol

had

Of

entered

course

by

into the

this
release

time

First

agreement

Security

and

extinguishing

First Security's obligations under the asset purchase agreement.

MEMO DECISION
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In conclusion the Court finds that Christenson while he
was president of First Security Financial did not receive notice
that any amounts due or to become due under the asset purchase
agreement had to be paid to Zions pursuant to an assignment
agreement.

The Court

is of the opinion that plaintiff has

failed to prove that notice of the assignment as required by law
was given to First Security through Mr, Christenson or in any
other way prior to the settlement agreement on July 10, 1985.
The Court finds that plaintiff has failed to prove that First
Security

received

sufficient

notice

of

the

assignment,

as

required by law, through any conversations that Mr, Christenson
may have had in the latter part of September with Ronald K.
Mitchell.
The Court therefore finds in favor of the defendant and
against the plaintiff.
First Security has raised the defense of laches and the
Court feels compelled to make a comment with regard to that
defense.

Defendant argues that from the time of the assignment

until the date of the settlement agreement between defendant and
Capitol, that is July 10, 1985, Zions set on it's rights under
the assignment, to the prejudice of First Security and that
therefore they are barred from making this claim based on the
doctrine

of

unpersuasive.

laches.

The

Court

finds

that

argument

to be

The Court has already stated that it appears to
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have been the intent of the parties that Zions would not attempt
a collection on the receiveable until and unless there was a
default by Capitol on the note.
that

Zions

proceeded

in

The Court is of the opinion

a timely

manner

to

collect

on

the

receiveable after Capitol and the other obligors were in default
on the note.
Counsel
Conclusions

of

for defendant
Law

and

is to prepare

a Judgment,

and

Findings

submit

the

of Fact,
same

to

opposing Counsel for approval as to form and then to the Court
for signature.
DATED this

_**
day of January, 1992.
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P. O, Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145-0385
Randall D, Benson
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER
10 East South Temple, #800
Salt Lake City, Utah
84133

L_

/n^n^ \(Q{L*~-

TabC

PI"T STRICT CWJOT
7i>

SJSICUM

District

SEP 2 5 1992
Craig Carlile (A0571)
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKEK
92 North University Avenue
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: (801) 226-7210
Attorneys for Defendant

r$ALi LAltfcCCrurtrY
v

Dapuiy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
OO0OO
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,
a national banking association,
and 4447 ASSOCIATES, a Utah
general partnership,

:
:

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
vs.
:

Civil No. 870901578CN

FIRST SECURITY FINANCIAL, a
Utah corporation,

:

Judge Frank G. Noel

Defendant,

:
ooOoo

This matter came on before the Court for trial without a
jury on January 6 and 7, 1992.

The parties stipulated to reserve

the issues of entitlement to and amount of attorneys' fees and costs
until after entry of judgment.

The plaintiffs were represented by

Jeffrey M. Jones and che defendant was represented by Mark O.
Morris.

The Court having considered the evidence, pleadings and

oral arguments submitted by the parties, and having entered a
Memorandum Decision, the Court makes the following Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law:

FINDINGS QF FACT
1.

First Security Financial ("First Security") and Capitol

Thrift & Loan Company ("Capitol") were parties to an Asset Purchase
Agreement and Closing Agreement dated December 10, 1982 and
December 13, 1982, respectively.

These two documents are

collectively referred to hereafter as the "Purchase Agreements."
2.

Pursuant to the Purchase Agreements, First Security

purchased certain assets from Capitol.

The Asset Purchase Agreement

provided that First Security would pay Capitol $1,007,777.42 on
December 13, 1985.

The Purchase Agreements also provided for

quarterly interest payments to be paid from First Security to
Capitol in the amount of $25,194.44.
3.

The Purchase Agreements also provided that the sum of

$1,007,777.42 due on December 13, 1985 was subject to an offset
amount not to exceed $1,000,000.00.
4.

Richard A. Christenson ("Christenson") was the

president, chief operating officer, and a director of First Security
from the time of its inception in December, 1982, through November,
1984.

He was also president and chief executive officer of Capitol

until June, 1984.
5.

From December, 1982 to and including September 27,

1984, First Security paid its quarterly interest installments to
Capitol.
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6.

In June, 1984/ the shareholders of Capitol/ including

Christenson, sold all of their Capitol stock to AFS Holding company,
an affiliate of the Bertagnole Investment Company.

In June, 1984,

Christenson ceased, for a period of time, to have any ownership
interests in Capitol, and ceased to function as an officer or
director,
7.

In the summer of 1984, Capitol owed Zions First

National Bank ("Zions") approximately $870,000 on a revolving line
of credit.
8.

This line of credit was unsecured.
On or about September 28, 1984, Emanuel A. Floor,

acting as president of Capitol, and Zions executed an Assignment and
Security Agreement, giving Zions a security interest in Capitol's
receivable owing on the Purchase Agreements and directing Capitol to
place First Security on notice of the Assignment and Security
Agreement.

This Assignment and Security Agreement (MAssignmentM)

was given to secure a $1 million note, dated September 28, 1984,
which Capitol executed in favor of Zions.

The purpose of this note

was to refinance the $870/000 obligation which was previously owed
to Zions by Capitol.
9.

Christenson personally guaranteed the September 28/

1984 Note up to $870,000.
10.

For the purposes of giving notice to First Security

concerning matters relating to the Asset Purchase Agreement, the
only address provided to Capitol by First Security was:
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First Security Financial
P.O. Box 30006
Salt Lake City, Utah 84130
ATTN: Treasurer
Between December, 1982 and July, 1985, any mail sent to this address
would have been delivered to Elmer Tucker,
11.

Elmer Tucker was the treasurer of First Security from

its inception through and beyond July 10, 1985.
12.

Emanuel A. Floor in his capacity as president of

Capitol executed a Notice of Assignment on or about September 28,
1984.

That Notice of Assignment was mailed to First Security but

was never received by First Security.
13.

Elmer Tucker never received the notice signed by Mr.

Floor, and was never made aware of the Assignment until 1986.
14.

No individual representing or authorized to act on

behalf of First Security received written notice of the assignment
prior to 1986.
15.

No one acting on behalf of Zions sent written notice

of the assignment to First Security prior to 1986, nor did Zions
communicate with First Security regarding the Assignment at any time
between September 8, J 984 and July 10, 1985.
16.

Zions never received written acknowledgement from

First Security that First Security had received notice of the
Assignment or notice of any purported obligation to pay any monies
under the receivable to Zions.
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17.

On September 28, 1984 Christenson was President, Chief

Executive Officer, and a director of First Security Financial.

At

that same time, he was not an officer, director or employee, nor had
he any ownership interests in Capitol.
18.

To the extent that Allen Potts ("Potts"), an employee

of Zions, discussed with Christenson the Assignment, the discussions
were primarily of an intent by Zions to enter into the agreement,
all of which discussions preceeded execution of the Assignment by
Capitol and Zions.
19.

Capitol did not default on its obligations secured by

the Assignment until at least December, 1985.
20.

The Assignment and Security Agreement, and the Notice

of Assignment both stated that First Security was obligated to make
all payments owing under the receivable payable jointly to Capitol
and Zions during the entire term of the Purchase Agreement.

Zions

never received directly from First Security any of the quarterly
interest payments it claims to have been entitled to under the
Assignment.
21.

Zions received interest and principal payments on the

Capitol loan directly from Bertagnole individuals or entities.
22.

Zions never attempted to collect any amounts from

First Security under the Assignment until after December of 1985.
23.

Prior to July, 1985, Christenson delivered on two

separate occasions his personal financial statements to the
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president of First Security/ Bud Cummings.

Paragraph 3 of each of

those financial statements reads as follows:
This represents my portion of the ownership of
Capitol Thrift & Loan based on the contract
amount I have with First Security Financial.
This receivable has been pledged to Zions First
National Bank.
24.

A third financial statement containing the identical

paragraph 3 referenced above was delivered by Christenson's attorney
to First Security's attorneys prior to July, 1985.
25.

On or about July 10, 1985, First Security, Christenson

and Capitol entered into that certain Settlement Agreement, Mutual
Release, and Covenant Not To Sue.
26.

In late 1986, 4447 Associates borrowed over three

million dollars from Zions, and used those proceeds to purchase,
among other things, a participation interest in the Capitol note,
which included a security interest in the collateral for the note,
First Security's receivable.

In June, 1990 Zions assigned to 4447

Associates all of its ownership interests in the Capitol loan and
the First Security receivable.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Utah Code Ann* §70A-9-318 applies to the Assignment and

Security Agreement.
2.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §70A-9-318, First Security

could not be held responsible to pay money to Zions under the
Purchase Agreements absent receipt by First Security of actual
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notice that the Assignment existed and that payments were to be made
to Zions by reason of the Assignment; First Security never received
such a notice.
3.

Knowledge of the existence of the Assignment alone, if

any such knowledge existed, did not impose a duty to inquire on
First Security.
4.

The pre-September 28, 1984, discussions between Allen

Potts and Richard Christensen and the information concerning the
Assignment contained in Mr, Christenson*s financial statements were
both insufficient to place First Security on notice that Zions
claimed and expected that payments under the Purchase Agreements
were to be made to Zions.
5.

First Security never received adequate, legal notice of

the Assignment sufficient to impose an obligation on First Security
which would preclude First Security from satisfying its obligations
under the Purchase Agreements directly with Capitol, the original
account creditor.
6.

The July 10, 1985 Settlement Agreement, Mutual Release,

and Covenant Not to Sue signed by First Security, Christenson and
Capitol relieved First Security of all obligations to pay any amount
under the Purchase Agreements.
7.

Entitlement to attorneys' fees and costs are reserved

and may be raised at any time by motion after entry of judgment.
The issue of attorneys* fees and costs are collateral issues that do
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not affect substantive issues in this matter, and thus, the judgment
shall be a final judgment, there being no just reason to delay entry
of a final judgment,

<G

~P-

DATED this ,j2> day of September, 1992.
BY THE COURT

Honorable Frdhk IGV^NO*§X4/
D i s t r i c t Court dSi(lq$±SA:''
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the r^ ' day of September, 1992, a
true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following:
Bruce J* Nelson
Jeffrey M. Jones
Craig H. Christensen
Allen, Nelson, Hardy & Evans
215 S State St #900
Salt Lake City UT 84111
Randall D. Benson
Callister, Duncan & Nebeker
10 E South Temple #800
Salt Lake City UT 84133
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